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Abstract. Web applications are the target of many well known exploits
and also a fertile ground for the discovery of security vulnerabilities.
Yet, the success of an exploit depends both on the vulnerability in the
application source code and the environment in which the application is
deployed and run. As execution environments are complex (application
servers, databases and other supporting applications), we need to have
a reliable framework to test whether known exploits can be reproduced
in different settings, better understand their effects, and facilitate the
discovery of new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present TestREx –
a framework that allows for highly automated, easily repeatable exploit
testing in a variety of contexts, so that a security tester may quickly and
efficiently perform large-scale experiments with vulnerability exploits.
It supports packing and running applications with their environments,
injecting exploits, monitoring their success, and generating security re-
ports. We also provide a corpus of example applications, taken from
related works or implemented by us.
Keywords: Software vulnerabilities, Exploits, Security testing, Exper-
imentation
1 Introduction
Web applications are nowadays one of the preferred ways of providing services to
users and customers. Modern application platforms provide a great deal of flex-
ibility, including portability of applications between different types of execution
environments, e.g., in order to meet specific cost, performance, and technical
needs. However, they are known to suffer from potentially devastating vulner-
abilities, such as flaws in the application design or code, which allow attackers
to compromise data and functionality (see, e.g., [42, 45]). Vulnerable web appli-
cations are a major target for hackers and cyber attackers [39], while vulner-
abilities are hard to identify by traditional black-box approaches for security
testing [13,28,43].
A key difficulty is that web applications are deployed and run in many dif-
ferent execution environments, consisting of operating systems, web servers,
? This paper is an extension of our previous work [14]
database engines, and other sorts of supporting applications in the backend,
as well as different configurations in the frontend [28]. Two illustrative examples
are SQL injection exploits (success depends on the capabilities of the underlying
database and the authorizations of the user who runs it [42, Chapter 9]), and
Cross-site Scripting (XSS) exploits (success depends on the browser being used
and its rules for executing or blocking JavaScript code [45, Chapter 14]). These
different environments may transform failed attempts into successful exploits
and vice versa.
Industrial approaches to black-box application security testing (e.g., IBM
AppScan4) or academic ones (e.g., Secubat [24] and BugBox [32]) require secu-
rity researchers to write down a number of specific exploits that can demonstrate
the (un)desired behavior. Information about the configuration is an intrinsic part
of the vulnerability description. Since the operating system and supporting ap-
plications in the environment can also have different versions, this easily escalates
to a huge number of combinations which can be hard to manually deploy and
test.
We need a way to automatically switch configurations and re-test exploits to
check whether they work with a different configuration. Such data should also be
automatically collected, so that a researcher can see how different exploits work
once the configuration changes. Such automatic process of “set-up configuration,
run exploit, measure result” was proposed by Allodi et al. [2] for testing exploit
kits, but it is not available for testing web applications.
Our proposed solution, TestREx5, combines packing applications and exe-
cution environments that can be easily and rapidly deployed, scripted exploits
that can be automatically injected, useful reporting and an isolation between
running instances of applications to provide a real “playground” and an experi-
mental setup where security testers and researchers can perform their tests and
experiments, and get reports at various levels of detail.
We also provide a corpus of vulnerable web applications to illustrate the
usage of TestREx over a variety of web programming languages. The exploit
corpus is summarized in Table 1. Some of the exploits are taken from existing
sources (e.g., BugBox [32] and WebGoat [35]), while others are developed by
us. For the latter category, we focused on server-side JavaScript, because of
its growing popularity in both open source and industrial usage (e.g., Node.js6
and SAP HANA7) and, to the best of our knowledge, the lack of vulnerability
benchmarks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes and com-
pares related work in the field of security experimentation; Section 3 presents an
overview of TestREx; Section 4 discusses the implementation of the framework;
Section 5 describes our evaluation of TestREx with testing various exploits, as
well as using it as an educational tool; Section 6 lists potential uses of TestREx,
4 http://www.ibm.com/software/products/en/appscan
5 http://securitylab.disi.unitn.it/doku.php?id=testrex
6 http://nodejs.org/
7 https://help.sap.com/hana
Table 1: Available exploits in TestREx corpus
Language Exploits Source
PHP 83 BugBox [32]
Java 10 WebGoat [35]
Server-side JavaScript 7 TestREx
focusing on an industrial context; finally, Section 7 concludes the paper with the
main lessons learned and a brief description of future work ideas. In the Appendix
we provide a detailed guide on how to contribute to TestREx.
2 Related Work
Security testing verifies and validates software requirements related to security
properties such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Felderer et al. [18]
argue that support for security testing is essential to increase its effectiveness
and efficiency in practice.
Such support requires the development of experimental frameworks where
developers can actually test and experiment with security bugs as advocated
initially in [7, 16, 29]. Yet, this is far from trivial and only few papers in main-
stream security conferences use experiments as their validation measure (e.g., at
IEEE S&P 2015 only 3 papers out of 55 used experiments [8]).
Indeed, a number of issues should be tackled in order to correctly provide se-
curity experimentation setups. These issues include isolation of the experimental
environment [2,5,6,32], repeatability of individual experiments [2,16], collection
of experimental results, and justification of collected data [29].
The use of a structured testbed can help in achieving greater control over
the execution environment, isolation among experiments, and reproducibility.
Most proposals for security research testbeds focus on the network level (e.g.,
DETER [5], ViSe [3], and vGrounds [23]). A comparison of network-based ex-
perimental security testbeds can be found in [41]. On the application level there
are significantly less experimental frameworks.
By using the taxonomy of Felderer et al. [18], the security testing process
must be present in every phase of the lifecycle: model-based security testing
between analysis and design; code-based testing and static analysis during de-
velopment; penetration testing and dynamic analysis during deployment; and
regression testing during maintenance. Application-based security experimental
frameworks such as TestREx, BugBox, or WebGoat support security testers at
the later stages of the lifecycle, namely deployment and maintenance.
Among the application level-frameworks, the BugBox framework [32] pro-
vides the infrastructure for deploying vulnerable PHP-MySQL web applications,
creating exploits and running these exploits against applications in an isolated
and easily customizable environment. As in BugBox, we use the concepts of ex-
ecution isolation and environment flexibility. However, we needed to have more
variety in software configurations and process those configurations automatically.
We have broadened the configurations scope by implementing software images
for different kinds of web applications, and automatically deploy them.
The idea of automatically loading a series of clean configurations every time
before an exploit is launched was also proposed by Allodi et al. in their Mal-
wareLab [2]. They load snapshots of virtual machines that contain clean software
environment and then “spoil” the environment by running exploit kits. This elim-
inates the undesired cross-influence between separate experiments and enforces
repeatability. So we have incorporated it into TestREx. For certain scenarios,
cross-influence might be a desired behavior, therefore TestREx makes it pos-
sible to run an experiment suite in which the experimenter can choose to start
from a clean environment for each individual exploit/configuration pair or to
reuse the same environment for a group of related exploits.
Maxion and Killourhy [29] have shown the importance of comparative ex-
periments for software security. It is not enough to just collect the data once, it
is also important to have the possibility to assess the results of the experiment.
Therefore, TestREx includes functionalities for automatically collecting raw
statistics on successes and failures of exploits. We summarize the discussed tools
and approaches in Table 2.
Nowadays, many exploits are publicly available in websites such as Packet
Storm8 and Exploit-DB9, or even integrated in penetration testing and exploita-
tion frameworks such as Metasploit10 and w3af11. There is also a growing black
market for zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits [1] (these are vulnerabilities for
which no patch is available yet). These exploits are usually provided “as is” and
their reliability, i.e., their success rate against different targets, can vary widely.
Exploit reliability has been studied in [15,21] and the conclusion of both studies
is that most exploits have a low success rate when used “off-the-shelf”. Both
studies were conducted for binary exploits (based on, e.g., buffer overflows). We
are unaware of any work studying the reliability of web application exploits. Al-
though we do not focus on increasing exploit reliability in this paper, TestREx
can be used for testing it against web applications running with different con-
figurations in different software environments.
Continuous system testing and quality control are also related to TestREx,
since they can be used to automate regression testing and testing of different
(evolving) versions of an application. Windmuller et al. [44] developed Active
Continuous Quality Control (ACQC), an approach that uses automata learning
to infer the behavior of web applications. Neubauer et al. [30] extended ACQC
to support risk-based testing [19] by steering the ACQC process to increase risk
coverage. TestREx differs from these works because it does not employ model
inference, as the application and the test cases (exploits) are given by the user.
8 https://packetstormsecurity.com/
9 https://www.exploit-db.com/
10 https://www.metasploit.com/
11 http://w3af.org/
Table 2: Security testing and experimentation tools
The existing tools and approaches provide various functionalities with respect to
deployment (e.g., from running on a local virtual machine to providing controlled
environments on real hardware). Most security research testbeds focus on the network
level, while on the application level there are significantly less experimental frameworks.
Tool Description Exploit types
BugBox [32]
A corpus and exploit simulation en-
vironment for PHP web application
vulnerabilities.
Selenium and Metasploit scripts
in Python that exploit PHP ap-
plication vulnerabilities.
MalwareLab [2] A controlled environment for exper-imenting with malicious software.
Programs that exploit various
software vulnerabilities or mal-
ware kits.
MINESTRONE
[17]
A software vulnerability testing
framework for C/C++ programs.
The applications are deployed in
virtualized environments via Linux
Containers
Programs that exploit memory
corruption, null pointer, number
handling and resource leak vul-
nerabilities in C/C++ software.
DETER [5]
A testbed facility that consists of
a large set (around 400) of real ma-
chines. The resources infrastructure
can be reconfigured on-the-fly upon
request.
Programs that exploit various
software vulnerabilities or mal-
ware kits.
ViSe [3]
A virtual testbed for reproduc-
ing and collecting the evidence
of security attacks that is based
on VMWare virtualization environ-
ment.
Multi-level attacks that include
network tampering and software
vulnerability exploitation.
SecuBat [24]
Web vulnerability scanner that au-
tomatically scans live web sites for
vulnerabilities using a web crawler
infrastructure.
Specially crafted HTTP re-
quests that exploit SQLi and
XSS vulnerabilities.
vGrounds [23]
A virtual playground for malware
assessment, that is created on top
of a physical infrastructure - a ma-
chine, a cluster or a multi-domain
overlay infrastructure.
Malicious software such as vir-
tual worms or malware kits.
The integration of evolving model inference techniques into our framework is an
interesting venue of future research.
3 Overview of TestREx
TestREx was designed to provide testers with a convenient environment for
automated, large-scale experiments. We believe that TestREx is useful for de-
velopers as well. To support this claim, we give an example of a possible loophole
in a bug fixing workflow of a hypothetical company:
– A tester finds a bug and opens a new issue in a bug tracking system. She
submits it as a test case described in natural language, explaining all pre-
conditions and steps needed to reproduce the bug.
– A manager assigns the issue to a developer. In order to pinpoint the source
of the bug and understand how to fix it, the developer must reproduce the
test case in his own setting. If the tester makes a mistake while creating the
test case, the developer will be unable to trigger the bug. As a consequence,
the developer rejects the fix request.
– In the worst case, it might take a long time before the bug will be re-
discovered and eventually fixed. In a better case, more resources are wasted
if the tester has to re-describe the bug, and a manager has to re-assign the
bug to a developer.
Using TestREx, the tester could create an “executable description” of a
bug in the form of a script, and a packed execution environment that allows to
instantly replay the situation that triggered the bug. Despite taking longer for
the tester to initially describe the bug this way, it has many advantages over the
natural language approach. First, the tester and the developer are ensured that
the bug can be reproduced. Second, the test case can be kept as a template on
which future tests can be developed, i.e., the first test is harder to describe, but
future tests can reuse parts of the first one. Third, the test can be automatically
added to a library of regression tests, to ensure that the same bug will be detected
if reinserted in future versions of the application.
3.1 Terminology
Before we proceed, we introduce several general concepts that we use for further
discussion12:
– Image – a snapshot of an application configured to run in a certain soft-
ware environment, including this software environment. An image can be
instantiated into a container that a tester can interact with.
– Configuration – Configurations are used for creating images. We use this
term as an intuitive meaning of a particular setup of an application and its
supporting software components with particular values of setup parameters
(configuration files, packages, etc.), as well as a set of instructions that are
automatically executed in order to create an image in which these applica-
tions and components are “deployed”.
– Container – an instance of an image. This instance represents a certain
state of an application and its software environment, that can be “run” for
testing, and dismissed when testing is over. It can be either started using the
pristine state of its base image (creating a new container, i.e., instance), or
12 Technically, these concepts are implemented using Docker (https://www.docker.
io/) – we describe the implementation in Section 4. However, a different implemen-
tation may be obtained using traditional virtual machines to which these general
concepts can be applied as well.
resumed from a certain existing state (re-using a container, that was already
instantiated).
3.2 Typical workflow
An automated testbed should help security researchers in answering (semi) au-
tomatically a number of security questions. Given an exploit X that successfully
subverts an application A running on an environment E:
1. Will X be successful on application A running on a new environment E′?
2. Will X be successful on a new version of the application, A′, running on the
same environment?
3. Will X also be successful on a new version of the application, A′, running
on a new environment E′?
These questions can be exemplified in the following situation:
Example 1. We have a working SQL injection exploit for the WordPress 3.2
application running with MySQL and, we would like to know whether (1) the
same exploit works for WordPress 3.2 running with PostgreSQL; (2) the same
exploit works for WordPress 3.3 running with MySQL; and (3) the same exploit
works for WordPress 3.3 and PostgreSQL. uunionsq
We use this example throughout the paper to illustrate the concepts and com-
ponents used in the framework.
A key feature that we have sought to implement, is that the architecture of
TestREx should be easily extensible to allow for the inclusion of new exploits,
applications, and execution environments. Figure 1 shows a typical workflow
when an application and the corresponding scripted exploits are deployed and
run within TestREx:
1. A tester provides the necessary configuration for a specific image, includ-
ing the application and software component files, and the scripted exploits
to be executed (the latter is optional, as TestREx also supports manual
testing).
2. The Execution Engine component of TestREx builds the image and in-
stantiates the corresponding container.
3. The Execution Engine runs corresponding exploit(s) against the applica-
tion container,
4. and monitors whether the exploit execution was successful.
5. After the exploit(s) are executed, the Execution Engine dismisses the corre-
sponding container (optionally, further exploits may reuse the same container
when the tester wishes to observe the cumulative effect of several exploits)
and cleans up the environment.
6. The exploit(s) execution report is generated.
One of the main goals of TestREx is to make the testing process as auto-
mated as possible. Another important task is to make it possible to run applica-
tions and exploits in a clean and isolated environment. Therefore, we included
the option of running every test against a clean state of the application. This
gives the possibility to run tests in parallel (see the point 5 above).
The workflow of TestREx is straightforward: a tester provides configuration details
of an application, its deployment environment, as well as the exploit scripts; TestREx
automates the remaining actions, such as building and loading the environment, and
running and monitoring the exploit.
Fig. 1: TestREx workflow
TestREx also includes some additional utilities. For instance, the Packing
Module allows to package configurations in compressed archive files that can
be easily deployed in another system running TestREx. Also, the Utilities
module includes a collection of scripts to import applications and exploits from
other sources, such as BugBox, and to manage images and containers.
Example 2. The inputs for Example 1 are instantiated as follows:
– Application: There are two applications of interest, each one is a set of
.html, .php and .js files in a Wordpress folder.
– Configuration: There are four interesting configurations, one for WP3.2
with MySQL, one for WP3.3 with MySQL, one for WP3.2 with PostgreSQL,
and one for WP3.3 with PostgreSQL.
– Image: There are two possible images, one with Ubuntu Linux distribution,
Apache web server and MySQL database engine, and one with Ubuntu,
Apache and PostgreSQL.
– Exploit(s): There is only one exploit – a script that navigates to the vulner-
able web page, interacts with it and injects a payload, simulating the actions
of an attacker. uunionsq
In our setting, exploits are unit tests: (1) every exploit is self-contained and
can be executed independently; and (2) every exploit is targeted to take advan-
tage of a specific vulnerability in a given application.
When using the framework in a specific application, the exploit can be written
by the tester or taken from a public source. In any case, the exploit code must
be compliant with what we expect from an exploit, e.g., it must be a subclass
of the BasicExploit class provided with TestREx, and contain metadata that
specifies the target image and describes the exploit script (more details are in
Section A.3 in the Appendix).
Aegis [12] extends the TestREx architecture to test run-time monitors,
enforcing control-flow and data-flow integrity, as well as authorization policies
in workflow-driven web applications. The synthesized monitors are deployed as
Docker containers, and tests are implemented as Selenium scripts – as we have
illustrated in Figure 113.
4 Implementation
TestREx is implemented in Python, mainly because it allows fast and easy
prototyping and because of the availability of libraries and frameworks, such as
docker-py to interface it with Docker (see below). Below we describe in details
the implementation of each component of the framework.
4.1 Execution Engine
The Execution Engine is the main TestREx module that binds all its features
together. It supports three modes of operation: single, batch and manual.
The single mode allows testers to specify and run a desired exploit against
a container that corresponds to the chosen application image just once. This is
useful when the tester wants to quickly check whether the same exploit works
for a few different applications, different versions of the same application or the
same application deployed in different software environments. A “.csv” report
is generated at the end of the run.
To run applications and exploits in the batch mode, TestREx loops through
a folder containing exploit files, and runs them against respective containers,
generating a summary “.csv” report in the end. In this mode, the Execution
Engine maps exploits to application images by scanning the metadata in each
exploit, where appropriate target images are specified by the tester.
For manual testing, the Execution Engine instantiates a container based
on the chosen application image, and returns the control to the tester (e.g., by
13 The steps of Aegis are: (1) start new containers with the appropriate applications;
(2) run the workflows by using the Selenium script; (3) repeat the workflows with
monitoring on; (4) capture results. At the end of the test session, the container can
be destroyed and a new one re-created if workflows’ history are accounted for, and
a pristine starting image is important for repeatability.
opening a web browser and navigating to the application, or returning a shell).
No report is generated in this case.
The Execution Engine contains an additional setting for handing containers
when chosen exploits are executed: it is possible to either destroy a particular
container after the execution, in order to start with a “fresh” instance of the
image for each exploit run; or to reuse the same container when its state has
to be preserved, so that further exploits may have a cumulative effect that the
tester wishes to observe.
4.2 Applications
Applications are packaged as “.zip” files containing all their necessary code and
other supporting files, such as database dumps. Unpacked applications must
be located under the “<testbed_root>/data/targets/ applications”
folder to be accessible by the Execution Engine.
As an example, we provide some applications with known vulnerabilities
(they are shown in Table 5, and their corresponding vulnerability types are listed
in Table 6), most of which are known real-world applications, only some of them
being small artificial examples developed by us to explore security vulnerabilities
typical for server-side JavaScript applications.
4.3 Images and Containers
Ideally, security testers should have the possibility of using various types of com-
puting components and platforms, regardless of the type of underlying hardware
and software that may be available.
To provide testers with the possibility of running applications in various en-
vironments in a flexible, scalable, and cost-effective manner, we employ software
images (that are, implementation-wise, Docker images). Every such image rep-
resents a data storage for virtualized computing components or platforms, e.g.,
operating systems, application servers, database management systems, and other
types of supporting applications.
Instead of creating virtual machines for applications and their software envi-
ronments, we instantiate and run containers from corresponding images. These
containers are based on the OCI14 standards, which are nowadays widely ac-
cepted in industry as a form of “lightweight virtualization” at the operating
system level. They are sandboxed filesystems that reuse the same operating sys-
tem kernel, but have no access to the actual operating system where they are
deployed.
Some initial developments in this area were FreeBSD Jails15, Solaris Zones16,
and Linux Containers17. Currently, Docker18 is the de facto standard for con-
14 https://www.opencontainers.org/
15 https://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/jails.html
16 https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E18440_01/doc.111/e18415/chapter_zones.htm
17 https://linuxcontainers.org/
18 https://www.docker.io/
tainers. Docker provides a format for packing and running applications within
lightweight file repositories that are called Docker containers. We use Docker to
create images and instantiate containers.
Images are specified in Dockerfiles (a format defined by the Docker project)
– these files represent configurations to which we refer in Section 3.1. Down-
loading generic software components and re-creating a Docker container from a
corresponding image every time an application has to be run might be resource-
and time-consuming. Therefore, we use image inheritance supported for Dock-
erfiles, creating several images for containers that hold generic software compo-
nents, and can be reused by certain types of web applications. For instance, such
images may encapsulate an operating system, a web server and a database en-
gine, and their corresponding containers are instantiated only once. We provide
some predefined images for common environments, using software components
shown in Table 3. We use the following naming convention for such images:
“<operating_system>-<webserver>-<database>-<others>”. In contrast, for
images which actually contain an application to be tested (apart from generic
software components) we use a different naming convention:
“<application-name>__[software-image-name]”.
When the Execution Engine invokes an application image, the correspond-
ing container will be instantiated and run using Docker. Then, depending on run
settings (see Section 4.1), the container will be handled correspondingly when
chosen exploits are executed (either destroyed, or reused for further exploit runs).
Table 3: Software components for generic images currently provided with
TestREx
Web server DB engine OS
Apache MySQL Ubuntu
Node.js MySQL Ubuntu
Node.js MongoDB Ubuntu
Tomcat MySQL Ubuntu
Figure 2 gives an intuition on how an image for theWordPress 3.2 application
can be composed with Dockerfiles: the image is created on the basis of two images
combining Ubuntu OS with Apache web server and MySQL database.
4.4 Configurations
Implementation-wise, configurations correspond to the contents of Dockerfiles
and supporting scripts that specify how an application can be installed and run
in a container, including, e.g., prerequisites such as preloading certain data to a
database, creating users, and starting a server. Additionally, configuration data
for applications may include databases and application data.
Application images are composed of several “layers”: an operating system, a web server,
and a database engine – the application itself is deployed on top. These components can
be combined in all possible configurations supported by the application.
Fig. 2: Wordpress3.2__ubuntu-apache-mysql image
The configuration files must be placed in a separate folder under the con-
figurations root folder (“<testbed_root>/data/targets/configurations”).
We use the following naming convention to simplify matching configura-
tion files with images that can be created using them: “<app-name>__
<app-container-name>”.
Example 3. A configuration folder for the application “Wordpress_3.2”, might
have the names “Wordpress_3.2__ubuntu-apache-mysql” or “Wordpress_3.
2__ubuntu-apache-postgresql”, depending on the image that is intended for
it. uunionsq
Listings 2.1 and 2.2 present an example of a Dockerfile and a
“run.sh” file, used to configure a WordPress 3.2 application within the
“ubuntu-apache-mysql” image.
Listing 2.1: Dockerfile example
FROM ubuntu−apache−mysql
RUN mkdir /var /www/wordpress
ADD . /var /www/wordpress
RUN chmod +x /var /www/wordpress /run . sh
CMD cd /var /www/wordpress && ./ run . sh
In Listing 2.1, line 1 specifies that the image for this application is built on
top of the “ubuntu-apache-mysql” image. In lines 2 and 3, the application files
are copied to the “/var/www/wordpress” folder in the image and in lines 4 and
5, the “run.sh” script is invoked inside the container.
Listing 2.2: Shell script file example
#!/bin /bash
mysqld_safe &
s l e ep 5
mysql < database . s q l
mysqladmin −u root password toor
apache2ct l s t a r t
In Listing 2.2, lines 2-5 are used to start the database server and pre-load
the database with application data. Line 6 starts the Apache web server.
4.5 Exploits
Table 4 shows the classification of typical security flaws that might be present
in both client- and server-side parts of a web application19, which can be tested
with TestREx. The following security flaws may be present in web applications
regardless of their implementation and deployment details. Yet, their successful
exploitation strongly depends on the actual variant of deployment (e.g., Mon-
goDB versus MySQL database, type and the version of the web server, etc.).
Table 4: Security flaws of web applications
Security flaw Description Technical
impact
SQL/NoSQL
injection
(SQLi/NoSQLi)
User input is used to construct a database query and
is not properly sanitized, allowing a malicious user to
change the intended database query into an arbitrary
one. Threats: Information Disclosure, Data In-
tegrity, Elevation of Privileges.
Severe
Code injection Similar to SQLi/NoSQLi, however, instead of a
database, user input is executed by a code/command
interpreter. Malicious payload can be executed on
both client and server, and may result into a complete
takeover of the host machine on which the vulner-
able application runs. Threats: Information Dis-
closure, Data Integrity, Elevation of Privileges,
Host Takeover.
Severe
Cross-site scripting
(XSS)
Each time a user-supplied data is being displayed in a
web browser, there is a risk of XSS attacks: attacker
can supply JavaScript code that either gets executed
in a victim’s browser and stealing victim’s credentials
or making actions on her behalf. Almost any source of
data can be an attack vector (e.g., direct user input,
data coming from a database, etc.). Threats: Infor-
mation Disclosure, Elevation of Privileges.
Moderate
19 This classification is according to the OWASP TOP 10: https://www.owasp.org/
index.php/Top_10_2013-Top_10
Table 4: Security flaws of web applications
Security flaw Description Technical
impact
Cross-site
request forgery
(CSRF)
CSRF attacks take advantage of benign applications
that allow attackers to act on their behalf: user is
secretly redirected from a trusted page to attacker’s
page, and user’s authentication information is used
by an attacker. Applications that allow manipula-
tions with DOM container of its pages are vulnerable.
Threats: Session/Credentials Hijacking.
Moderate
Unvalidated
URL redirects
URL redirects instruct the web browser to navigate
to a certain page. While this feature can be useful in
many different contexts, developers should be care-
ful and restrict user manipulations with a destination
page: an attacker may conduct phishing attacks us-
ing a trustworthy website that has this vulnerability.
Threats: Open Redirect.
Moderate
Sensitive data
disclosure
Sensitive/Personal data is attractive for attackers per
definition, therefore the goal of most of attacks is to
get a piece of such data. Since personal data is usually
protected by law regulations, every such data flow in
a web application must be protected against injection
and interception attacks, as well as overly detailed er-
ror messages and application logic flaws that disclose
context information to potential attackers. Threats:
Information Disclosure.
Severe
Test code leftovers A tester may insert a piece of testing code into the
application and forget to remove it upon release. This
can lead to any kind of unexpected behavior: for ex-
ample, anyone could get access to the application with
a login ’Bob’ and a password ‘123’ gaining full admin-
istrator access. Such forgotten pieces of test code are
indistinguishable from maliciously crafted backdoors
per se. Threats: Backdoor.
Severe
Using known
vulnerable
components
If vulnerable versions of third-party components are
used (e.g., an open source library) in a web appli-
cation, an attacker can identify known vulnerabili-
ties and perform a successful attack. In many cases,
developers are not aware of all components they are
using for their application. Vulnerable component de-
pendencies aggravate the problem. Threats: Poten-
tially all of the above.
May vary
In TestREx, exploits may be any executable file that, when executed in a
specified context, provide testers with unauthorized access to, or use of function-
ality or data within that context. Exploits include any sequence of steps that
must be taken in order to cause unintended behavior through taking advantage
of a vulnerability in an application and/or surrounding environment. For exam-
ple, exploits may be used to provide access to sensitive data, such as financial
data or personal data. Exploits may hijack capabilities or other functionalities of
applications and cause the applications to perform tasks that are not desired by
authorized users, such as tracking user activities and reporting on these to the
unauthorized user of the exploit. Other types of exploits may allow unauthorized
users to impersonate authorized users.
Still, the above description of an exploit is quite vague, and may lead to
having many automated exploit scripts that are not compatible due to various
differences in their implementation (e.g., as a consequence it may be difficult
to run them in a batch, and/or use them to produce a unified testing report).
To avoid these potential problems, we implemented exploits as a hierarchy of
Python classes that have the following minimal set of properties: (1) every ex-
ploit contains metadata describing its characteristics such as name, description,
type, target application and container; (2) exploit classes must pass logging in-
formation and results of the run to the Execution Engine, providing a way for
the Execution Engine to know that the exploit execution was successful.
We also incorporate the Selenium Web Driver20 for implementing exploits,
as it can be used to simulate user/attacker actions in a web browser, and pro-
vides all necessary means to automate them. Additionally, it supports JavaScript
execution and DOM interaction [32]. Every Selenium-based exploit in the frame-
work is a subclass of the BasicExploit class, which encapsulates basic Selenium
functionality to automate the web browser (e.g., “setUp()” and “tearDown()”
routines, logging and reporting, etc.). To create a new exploit, the tester has
to create a new exploit class, specify the exploit-specific metadata and override
the “runExploit()” method by adding a set of actions required to perform an
exploit. The success of an exploit run is also verified within the “runExploit()”
method - this might be different for every exploit. This allows us to handle com-
plex exploits that are not always deterministic, such as heap spraying. For such
cases, the exploit can be specified to run a certain number of times until it is
considered a success or a failure.
4.6 Report
Different context conditions may transform failed exploit attempts into success-
ful ones, and vice versa. A given exploit test may include a number of possi-
ble combinations of applications, execution environments, and exploits, each of
which may be configured in various ways. For example, an exploit that may
be successful in exploiting a first application in a first environment may not
be successful in exploiting that same application in a second environment, but
may be successful in exploiting a second application in the second environment.
Moreover, upon determining a success of a given exploit, it will be necessary to
make some change to the application and/or execution environment, which will
necessitate yet another testing (re-testing) of the previously successful exploit to
ensure that the change will prevent future successful exploits.
20 http://docs.seleniumhq.org/projects/webdriver/
Table 5: Applications in the corpus
The table shows the applications (real-world and artificial ones) that TestREx
currently includes. The “Base Images” column specifies a base image which is used for
creating a specific application image, and the “Source” column specifies the source from
which we adapted exploits for these applications.
Language Applications Base Images Source
PHP
WordPress, CuteFlow, Horde, PHP
Address Book, Drupal, Proplayer,
Family Connections, AjaXplorer, Gig-
press, Relevanssi, PhotoSmash, WP
DS FAQ, SH Slideshow, yolink search,
CMS Tree page view, TinyCMS, Store
Locator Plus, phpAccounts, Schreikas-
ten, eXtplorer, Glossword, Pretty Link
ubuntu-apache-mysql BugBox
Java WebGoat ubuntu-tomcat-java WebGoat
Server-side
JavaScript
CoreApp, JS-YAML, NoSQLInjection,
ODataApp, SQLInjection, ST, Word-
Press3.2, XSSReflected, XSSStored
ubuntu-node,
ubuntu-node-mongo,
ubuntu-node-mysql
Our
examples
Therefore, we include a reporting functionality: whenever TestREx runs an
exploit, it generates a report that contains the information about its execution. A
report is a “.csv” file that the Execution Engine creates or updates every time
it runs an exploit. Every report contains one line per exploit that was executed.
This line consists of the exploit and the target application names, identifier of
an application-specific container, the type of the exploit, the exploit start-up
status, the exploit execution result, and a comment field that may include other
information that might be exploit-specific. Along with this report, the Execution
Enginemaintains a log file that contains information which can be used to debug
exploits.
Notice that this reporting functionality is also considered critical by bad guys
and is therefore present in almost all exploit kits available on black markets [25].
Example 4. The listing below shows a single entry from the Word-
press_3_2_XSS exploit that was run against the WordPress 3.2 application.
uunionsq
Listing 2.3: An example of the report file entry after the exploit run
Wordpress_3_2_XSS , Wordpress3 . 2 , ubuntu−apache
−mysql , XSS , CLEAN, SUCCESS, SUCCESS, 30 .345 ,
Exp lo i t s for "XSS vu l n e r a b i l i t y in WordPress app"
5 Evaluation
As a starting point in the evaluation of TestREx, we successfully integrated
10 example exploits from WebGoat [35], as well as the corresponding vulnerable
web applications. We also developed exploits for 7 specially crafted vulnerable
applications, in order to demonstrate different types of exploits for SQL injection,
NoSQL injection, Stored and Reflected XSS, Path Traversal and Code Injection
vulnerabilities in applications that rely on server-side JavaScript: the examples
for the latter two vulnerability types take advantage of vulnerabilities discovered
in Node.js modules [33,34].
Table 6: Number of exploits in the corpus
The table lists the number of exploits in the current corpus of TestREx, broken
down by a vulnerability type and a programming language of the vulnerable portion of
the source code that makes the exploitation possible.
Exploit #PHP #Java #Server JS
XSS 46 2 3
SQLi 17 2 1
Code injection 7 - 1
Auth. flaws 4 3 -
Info. disclosure 2 - -
Local file incl. 2 - -
CSRF 2 - -
DoS 1 - -
DB backdoor - 1 -
Param. tampering - 2 -
Path traversal - - 1
As TestREx also supports the possibility of importing applications and
exploits from other similar testbeds, we imported all exploits and corresponding
applications from BugBox [32]. We used an automated script that copies the
applications and exploits into the corresponding folders under TestREx, and
creates identical configuration files for every imported application, using Apache
as a web server and MySQL as a database server. We were able to run most of
the BugBox [32] native exploits and collect statistics without modifying their
source code. However, we had to create a specific base image (as specified in
Table 5), as well as application images for BugBox applications.
Table 6 summarizes the types of exploits that we tested in various appli-
cations using TestREx: it shows that TestREx supports a variety of typical
web application security flaws. This successful case study was instrumental for
SAP to decide to put forward a patent application of the technology behind
TestREx [37].
We also used TestREx for an edition of the Laboratory on Offensive Tech-
nologies course taught at the University of Trento, Italy. The goal was to teach
MSc students enrolled into the Computer Science program about web application
vulnerabilities and exploits by: (i) exploring the vulnerability corpus provided
with TestREx, and (ii) enlarging the corpus with new exploits developed from
scratch by them, or ported from other sources. In the Appendix, we show an
example of one exploit added to the corpus and detail the process of adding
it. Adding an exploit consists of three steps: deploying an application, creating
configuration files and building containers, and creating and running an exploit.
We had the students focus on understanding the last step, the actual exploits,
in the first moment, so that in a second moment they could write exploits for
any application they wanted.
Although some students completed the assignments using TestREx, other
students enrolled in the course preferred to develop system exploits (the two
tracks were offered as possibilities at the beginning of the course). We were
unable to draw relevant statistics about how the use of TestREx impacted
the learning process, since that was the first edition of the course and there
were only around 20 students in total (which is not statistically relevant, if we
assume the usual 30 as the cut-off number). Nevertheless, we can affirm that
TestREx helped in the preparation and teaching of the course as a source of
ready examples that could be easily run and analyzed in students’ laptops (with
varying configurations of hardware and software). In the future, we intend to
analyze the use of TestREx with a larger number of students and possibly
professional penetration testers, following an approach inspired by [9].
6 Potential Industrial Applications
There are several uses of TestREx that we are exploring in an industrial setting,
covering different phases of the Secure Development Lifecycle [22] (SDL), and
fulfilling the needs of different stakeholders. Below we summarize the activities
in different phases of the SDL that can benefit from using TestREx. Part of
this work has also been an object of a US Patent [37].
6.1 Preparation and Training
Part of a training toolkit. Security awareness campaigns, especially secure
coding training, are commonly conducted in large enterprises, also in response
to requirements from certification standards. From our own experience with
TestREx, we believe that writing exploits may be an effective way to acquire
hands-on knowledge of how security vulnerabilities work in practice and how to
code defensively in order to prevent them. To quickly create a large corpus of ar-
tificially vulnerable applications for training purposes, it is possible to start from
well-known applications and use vulnerability injection, as done in [20,36]. This
way, we can easily create multiple examples for each category of vulnerabilities,
with different levels of complexity for detection or exploitation.
6.2 Design
Security testing of cloud-based applications. One valuable use of
TestREx is for cloud-based applications. In this scenario, a Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) provides the platform on which an Application Provider (AP)
may run their applications. CSPs allow the same application to be provided
on different platforms. However, such variations in context correspond to po-
tential difficulties in ensuring reliable and complete security testing, because
successful protection against an exploit in one context may prove unsuccessful
in another context. In this setting, TestREx can provide highly adaptable, flex-
ible, efficient, and reliable testing for different configurations, without requiring
highly-specialized knowledge or abilities on the part of the security tester. For
example, the security tester may be an employee of a CSP, which may wish to
assure its customer APs that a secure platform is in place. In turn, the security
tester may be part of the AP, who wishes to obtain independent testing of one
or more platforms or platform providers.
6.3 Implementation and Verification
Automated validation and regression testing. As part of the software
development lifecycle, TestREx can be used to check the absence of known
vulnerabilities or to perform regression tests to verify that a previously fixed
vulnerability is not introduced again. To this end, a corpus of exploits and con-
figurations is stored in a corporate-wide repository and is used to perform au-
tomated tests all along the development cycle. In large corporations, the results
of these tests are part of the evidence needed in order to pass quality assurance
gates. Currently, much of the process to produce such evidence relies on manual
work, which increases cost, errors and unpredictability of the process. TestREx
can be used to accelerate and improve the effectiveness and the predictability of
quality assurance processes.
Support for penetration testing. An important problem arising in pene-
tration testing of large systems is the complexity of setting-up and reproducing
the conditions of the target system – typically involving many hosts and soft-
ware components, each of which may need to be configured in a specific way.
A key strength of our framework is the ability to capture these configurations
as reusable scripts; this requires a non-negligible effort, but the results can be
reused across different penetration testing sessions. This has the advantage of
providing automation, reproducibility, and the ability to proceed stepwise in the
exploration of the effect of different configurations and versions of the software
elements on the presence (or absence) of vulnerabilities in the system.
6.4 Release and Response
“Executable documentation” of vulnerability findings. When a vulnera-
bility is found in a product, the ability to reproduce an attack is key to inves-
tigate the root cause of the issue and to provide a timely solution. It is current
practice to use a combination of natural language and scripting to describe the
process and the configuration necessary to reproduce an attack. The results of
this practice may be erratic and complicate the security response. TestREx
exploit scripts and configurations can be seen as “executable descriptions” of an
attack. The production of exploits and configurations could not just be the task
of the security validation department, but also of external security researchers,
for which the company might set up a bounty program requiring that vulnera-
bilities are reported in the form of TestREx scripts.
Malware analysis. Malicious third-party applications, also known as mal-
ware, are applications intentionally designed to harm their victims, by, e.g.,
stealing information or taking control of the victim’s computer. Malware in gen-
eral, and especially web malware, are known to react differently to different
environments (usually to avoid detection) [11, 27]. Containers provide safe and
repeatable environments for malware analysts to run their experiments. One
possible use of TestREx is as a highly configurable sandboxing environment,
where malware analysts can run potentially malicious applications in different
configurations of an application to study its behavior. Another possible use is as
a honeypot generator. Honeypots [10] are intentionally vulnerable applications
deployed on a network to capture and study attacks.
Security testing of third-parties components. According to the Black
Duck study [40] more than 65% of proprietary software vendors integrate Free
and Open Source Software (FOSS) components into their applications. Since
enterprise software typically has long maintenance and support lifecycles, older
versions of FOSS components must be supported as well. When a new vulner-
ability in a FOSS component is discovered, the vendor has to verify whether if
affects customers that are using different versions of the software applications
which may also contain different (older) versions of the FOSS component. How-
ever, in this setting, traditional security testing with static and dynamic analysis
tools and code reviews may be complicated [4,26,38]. In this scenario, TestREx
can be used to test whether the customers whose versions of software applica-
tions are relying on older versions of a FOSS component are affected by a newly
disclosed vulnerability in a much newer version of that component (which may
not be the case, see [31]).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presentedTestREx, a Framework for Repeatable Exploits that
combines a way of packing applications and execution environments, automatic
execution of scripted exploits, and automatic reporting, providing an experimen-
tal setup for security testers and researchers. TestREx provides means for the
evaluation of exploits, as the exploits are reproduced in a number of different
contexts, and facilitates understanding of effects of the exploits in each context,
as well as discovery of potential new vulnerabilities.
We also provide a corpus of applications and exploits, either adapted from
the existing works, or developed by us – we collected it to test the variety of
applications and exploits that can be handled by TestREx.
7.1 Lessons learned
We can summarize the key lessons learned during the design and development of
TestREx as follows: (1) build on top of existing approaches; (2) have a simple
and modular architecture; (3) find reliable information on applications, exploits
and execution environments in order to replicate them.
Building on top of the existing work, like we did with BugBox [32] for the
format of our exploits, and MalwareLab [2] for the vulnerability experimentation
design, was extremely valuable. This simplified our design and development time,
and allowed us to quickly add a large corpus of applications and exploits on which
we could test our implementation.
The functionality that TestREx offers can be achieved to a certain extent by
separately using its individual tool components. For example, a tester can use
a regular virtual or physical machine (or plain Docker) to deploy the software
components of interest, and then either run a Selenium script or perform manual
testing. However, she will have to become acquainted with all these tools and
perform the experiments manually.
This approach only works if (i) the tester has only one single configuration
to deploy and (ii) s/he has one single vulnerability to test, and (iii) the tester
is both a security expert and a functional expert (i.e. knows the application and
the actually deployed configurations). In all other cases, repeatedly using the
individual tools would not scale.
Indeed, to create and test an exploit, a tester must first understand the
“mechanics” of a vulnerability that can be exploited, or adapt existing exploits to
specific conditions. Also, in many cases, publicly available exploit descriptions are
vague, limited to a proof-of-concept (which may not necessarily work), and often
lack information on how to reproduce them in a specific software environment.
Then this must be adapted to the actual configurations that are used in the
company. This may be quite difficult due to the fact that the information on how
to configure a certain application environment may not be detailed enough in the
official documentation. Therefore, a functional expert may be more appropriate,
but s/he may not have the security skills needed to deploy the vulnerability.
Instead, TestREx provides a completely automated solution in which the
knowledge of different aspects can be “hidden away” from its different users
(e.g., security testers might only need to know how to write and run exploit
scripts, and everything else will be just “hooked up” and executed right out of
the box; a functional tester would only need to write the configuration and just
use the exploit scripts as provided).
Large scale usage of TestREx requires an initial investment which lies in cre-
ating a set of software configurations (images) that can be then reused company-
wide: as we learned during the evaluation of TestREx, creating reliable software
configurations is the most difficult part, while creating exploit scripts is compar-
atively easy. However, once this initial effort is invested, it becomes extremely
easy to add new exploit scripts, run them in different combinations, combine
different software images (we use Docker inheritance), and collect reports.
7.2 Future work
We intend to extend the architecture of TestREx to add support for plug-
ins. Plugins (e.g., proxy tools, vulnerability scanners) could be used to facilitate
activities such as pentesting, vulnerability analysis, and malware analysis, men-
tioned in section 6.
We would also like to expand the current vulnerability corpus by taking public
exploits from, e.g., Exploit-DB and reconstructing the vulnerable environments
in TestREx.
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A Contributing to TestREx
Here we describe in more detail the steps needed to add an experiment to
TestREx, given an existing application. These steps consist of: adding an appli-
cation; creating configuration files for images; instantiating containers; creating
and running exploits. Again, we use WordPress 3.2 as the example application.
A.1 Deploying an Application
The code of the application must be copied into a separate folder under the
applications root “<testbed_root>/data/targets/applications”. The folder
name must correspond to a chosen name of the application in the testbed.
To deploy the WordPress 3.2 application, copy all of its files to the folder
“<testbed_root>/data/targets/applications/WordPress_3_2”.
A.2 Creating Configuration Files and Building Containers
If there are no generic images that might be reused for creating a new image for
the application set up, this image must be created in the first place. Configuration
files for generic images are located under the “<testbed_root>/data/targets/
containers” folder.
In our example, we create a generic image with the ubuntu-apache-mysql
name, since the application requires Apache as a web server and MySQL as a
database engine. To do this, we create a Dockerfile under “<testbed_root>
/data/targets/containers/ubuntu-apache-mysql” that contains the code
shown in Listing 2.4, and build it with the script located under “<testbed_
root>/util/build-images.py”.
Listing 2.4: The Dockerfile for creating the ubuntu-apache-mysql generic image
FROM ubuntu : r a r i ng
RUN apt−get update
RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=non in t e r a c t i v e apt−get −y i n s t a l l mysql−c l i e n t mysql
−s e r v e r apache2 l ibapache2−mod−php5 php5−mysql php5−ldap
RUN chown −R www−data :www−data /var /www/
EXPOSE 80 3306
CMD [" mysqld " ]
As a next step, we create configuration files for the image that will hold the
application, extending the above generic image. We create a new Dockerfile and
a shell script file under the “<testbed_root>/data/targets/configurations/
Wordpress_3_2__ubuntu-apache-mysql” folder (see Listings 2.1 and 2.2 in the
Section 4.4 for the code examples).
There is no need to manually invoke Docker for instantiating a container
based on this image for running exploits or manual testing, as Execution Engine
does it automatically.
A.3 Creating and Running an Exploit
Finally, we create an exploit for the Wordpress 3.2 application by creating
a Python class under the “<testbed_root>/data/exploits” folder. As men-
tioned in the previous sections, to ensure integration with the Execution
Engine, the new exploit class must be a subclass of the already existing
BasicExploit class. As a last step, we specify the exploit’s metadata using
the attributes dictionary, and specify the steps required to run the exploit
within the “runExploit()” method (see Listing 2.5).
Listing 2.5: Wordpress_3_2_Exploit.py file contents
from Bas i cExp lo i t import Bas i cExp lo i t
class Explo i t ( Bas i cExp lo i t ) :
a t t r i b u t e s = {
’Name ’ : ’Wordpress_3_2_XSS ’ ,
’ Desc r ip t i on ’ : "XSS attack in Wordpress 3 .2 " ,
’ Target ’ : "Wordpress3 . 2 " ,
’ Container ’ : ’ ubuntu−apache−mysql ’ ,
’Type ’ : ’XSS ’
}
def runExplo i t ( s e l f ) :
w = s e l f . wrapper
w. nav igate ( "http :// l o c a l h o s t :49160/ wordpress /wp−admin/post−new . php
?post_type=page" )
‘ ‘ ‘
‘ ‘ ‘
content_elt = w. f i nd ( " content " ) . c l e a r ( )
content_elt . keys ( "<sc r i p t >a l e r t (\"XSS ! ! \ " )</s c r i p t >" )
w. f i nd ( " pub l i sh " ) . c l i c k ( )
w. nav igate ( "http :// l o c a l h o s t :49160/ wordpress /?page_id=23" )
a l e r t_text = w. catch_aler t ( )
s e l f . a s s e r t I n ( "XSS" , a le r t_text , "XSS" )
Listing 2.5 shows the stored XSS exploit for the Wodpress 3.2 application.
The script navigates to the login page of the Wordpress application, logs in as
the administrator (the full list of steps is shortened in the listing for the sake of
brevity), and creates a new post putting the <script>alert(‘XSS‘)</script>
string as the content. To verify whether the exploitation was successful, the script
navigates to the newly created post and checks if an alert box with the “XSS”
message is present.
In order to test whether the same exploit would work for different older or
newer versions of the Wordpress application, a tester may reuse the configuration
files of Wordpress 3.2. She only needs to provide the application files of that
version. We indeed tested the exploit from the example on other versions of
Wordpress: 4.2.15 and 4.8 (the latest available version). It works against the
first, but does not the work against the latter, as this vulnerability was fixed for
the latest version.
Listing 2.6 shows the list of commands for different running modes in
TestREx:
1. To run the application container for manual testing, a tester has to use the
“–manual ” flag and the corresponding application image. TestREx will run
the container and halt, waiting for the interrupt signal from the tester. In
this mode, when the container is up, the application can be accessed from a
web browser by navigating to “http://localhost:49160”.
2. In the single mode a tester can select a specific exploit and run it against a
specific application image.
3. In the batch mode for a single application, a tester has to specify the running
mode as “–batch”, and select the desired application image. TestREx will
invoke a Docker container for the image, search for the exploits that are
assigned to the application (through exploits’ metadata), and run all of them
one by one.
4. Finally, if a tester specifies nothing but the “–batch” running mode,
TestREx will invoke containers for all application images that are currently
in the corpus, and run all corresponding exploits against them.
Listing 2.6: Running modes in TestREx
#1: Manual mode
sudo python run . py −−manual −−image
[ app−name ]__[ image−name ]
#2: Sing le e x p l o i t mode
sudo python run . py −−e xp l o i t [ exp l o i t−name ] . py
−−image [ app−name ]__[ image−name ]
#3: Batch mode for a s i n g l e app l i ca t i on
sudo python run . py −−batch
−−image [ app−name ]__[ image−name ]
#4: Batch mode for a l l app l i ca t i ons
sudo python run . py −−batch
By default, the exploit execution report is saved into the “<testbed_root>
/reports/ExploitResults.csv” file. In order to specify a different location for
the results, the tester may add an additional parameter to the run command:
–results new/location/path.csv.
